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1. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade ago, the People's Republic of China
(the "PRC" or "China") surprised the world with a new policy
of openness towards foreign investment on Chinese soil.1 This
new policy was geared towards "bringing China back into the
world's economic mainstream."2 The attraction of foreign
investment to China was a paramount goal in achieving a
place for China on the international economic stage. The
equity joint venture ("EJV") was one of the first vehicles used
to stimulate foreign investment in China and set this new plan
of economic reform into motion.3
However, China's open arms, outstretched to the West,
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Law School; LL.M. International and Comparative Law 1992, Georgetown
University Law Center. The author is currently an Attorney-Advisor, Office
of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Office of the General
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' Report of the Round-Table Organized by the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade, People's Republic of China, Beijing, 25 and
26 May 1987, Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China,
54 (United Nations, 1988) [hereinafter Round-Table Report].
2 Bin Xue Sang & George D. Wilson, Capital and Technology: China
Rejoins the Modern Business World-An Analysis of China's Equity Joint
Ventures Law, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 511, 511 (1991).
' Id. This Article will focus on equity joint ventures to the exclusion of
contractual or cooperative joint ventures, although the latter type of joint
venture is mentioned in section 3, infra, in the context of a discussion of
other major forms of direct foreign investment in China.
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have encountered considerable caution on the part of the
foreign investment community. Within a very short period of
time, the initial enthusiasm, thought by many to be induce-
ment of a surge of foreign investment into China as the latest
investment frontier, began to wane.4 This occurred because
the original equity joint venture law, promulgated in 1979'
(the "1979 Law" or "JV Law"), was generally regarded as
suffering from vagueness and the lack of a complementary
domestic legal framework.'
Further, the notorious suppression of the democratic
movement in China of the Tiananmen Square incident" added
to the hesitancy of foreign investors. This incident only made
them more reluctant to risk their investment dollars in an
investment climate aggravated by such political instability.
Foreign investors also understandably questioned how long
the Chinese would welcome this new influx of foreign invest-
ment. Surely China did not intend to abandon overnight its
staunch and notorious reputation for self-reliance, to the point
of achieving near total isolation, economic and otherwise, from
the rest of the world.' To some, the message seemed clear
that foreign investment dollars were regarded by the Chinese
as a conduit solely for the acceleration of its economic well-
being.9 Indeed, some foreign investors believed that this
outward show of tolerance to foreign investment was some-
thing that "the Chinese Communist Party will only admit
internally ... [i]s a stage on the road to the inevitable
adoption of communism."" In short, from the onset of this
4 Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 62.
s The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted by The Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress, July 1, 1979 (effective July 8, 1979),
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1163 (1979) [hereinafter JV Law].
' L. Crawford Brickley, Comment, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's
Republic of China: The Promised Land is Not Yet in Sight for Foreign
Investors, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 257, 259 (1988).
7Paul D. McKenzie, Foreign Exchange and Joint Ventures with China:
Short-Term Strategies and Long-Term Prospects, 17 CAN. BUS. L.J. 114, 145
(1990).
" IKE MATHUR & JAI-SHENG CHEN, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT VENTURES IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 134 (1987).
9Id.
10 NIGEL CAMPBELL, A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO EQUITY JOINT VENTURES IN
CHINA 18 (1989).
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program that welcomed foreign investors to China, the PRC
was and remains a socialist country with a centralized
economy as its main economic feature."
The questions of just how long and to what extent capitalis-
tic notions will be tolerated as an overlay upon one of the
world's few remaining socialist regimes remain, as yet,
unanswered. Chinas recent tolerance for such notions of the
Western world are noteworthy, however, at the very least as
a testament to the willingness of China to suppress its
xenophobic tendencies"2 in exchange for realizing economic
health. And, assuming this culture can co-exist harmoniously
with Western business practices, the union in the joint venture
setting is arguably a very complementary one. For the
Chinese joint venture partner, this enterprise provides a
means of obtaining advanced technology, manufacturing goods
for export and generating much needed foreign currency."
For the Western joint venture partner, China represents one
vast, untapped consumer market that is rich in both human
and natural resources.'
China, in the past several years, has clarified and amended
its joint venture law with some frequency. 5 A central thesis
of this Article is that the evolution of China's joint venture law
11 RICHARD D. ROBINSON, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA
10 (1987).
" Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 513. China has long harbored a deep
distrust for the Western legal establishment. Steven N. Robinson & George
R.A. Doumar, "It Is Better to Enter a Tiger's Mouth Than a Court of Law"
or Dispute Resolution Alternatives in U.S.-China Trade, 5 DICK. J. INTVL L.
247, 251 (1987). In the 1800s, China sought to eliminate the smuggling of
opium into China by British citizens by invoking Western concepts of
international law. China's Imperial Commissioner, Lin Tse-hsu, sought to
employ legal concepts espoused in Vattel's The Law of Nations by writing
to Britain's Queen Victoria to enlist her help in restraining her citizens from
engaging in illegal trade. China's request to the Queen was answered by
the first Opium War, which Britain started and won. This marked a period
of extreme humiliation for China, causing it to withdraw from participation
in the international economic arena. Id. at 250-51.
"S Lee M. Zeichner, Note, Chinese Solutions to Legal Problems:
Repatriating Business Profits from the People's Republic of China, 19 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 385, 388 (1987), citing Zhang, Improving Conditions for
Joint Ventures, BEIJING REV., Sept. 1, 1986, at 4.
14 Lixing Zhang, The Statutory Framework for Direct Foreign Investment
in China, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 289, 290 (1989). China has a population of over
one billion people. Id.
15 See infra notes 72 and 134 and accompanying text.
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has been in the distinct direction of accommodation to the
Western investor. Many difficulties still exist, however, for
foreign investors in China. And, if China wants to maintain
a place on the map as a favorable venue for foreign invest-
ment, this evolution must continue in a way that meaningfully
addresses the concerns of foreign investors.
Section 2 of this Article examines the cultural backdrop in
China against which the current economic reform program
operates. It focuses on Chinese ideology and attitude towards
law, the program of modernization, and foreign investment as
an integral part of that program. The legal framework for
equity joint ventures in China is also outlined here. Section
3 explores the other major forms of direct foreign investment
in China. It then turns to a detailed discussion of the original
joint venture law, the regulations implementing that law and
recent amendments to it. Section 4 focuses on the lingering
problems that face foreign investors in China, and discusses
some possible solutions to these problems.
2. ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
2.1. Chinese Ideology and Attitude Towards Law
To grasp fully the significance of the economic reform in
China, one must understand China's ideology and attitude
towards law in the pre-reform era. The two central norms that
underlie China's pre-reform ideology are 1i" and "fa." The
Confucian concept of "I? refers to social standards of conduct
necessary to maintain order in society." This concept embod-
ies the notion that positive law is unwarranted because a
breach of "Ii" would result in societal sanction with far graver
consequences than any embodied in a penal code. Juxtaposed
with the concept of "li" is the legalistic concept of "fa," or
law.1  "Fa" is something of a necessary evil in place to
ensure an orderly society. In theory, its impact is reserved
only for those so low on the social stratum that the looming
threat of being a social outcast is rendered meaningless.
6 Alison L. Patrucco, Equity Joint Ventures with the People's Republic
of China: A Puzzle in Politics, Law, and Tradition, 10 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 609, 619 (1987).17 Ld
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Nevertheless, as discussed below, China has demonstrated an
outward show of tolerance for a more prominent place for law
in its society.
The traditional Chinese abhorrence of law is manifested in
their similar dislike for written law. 8 The role of written
law in China was one of a backstop; it was resorted to only
when the Confucian concepts of propriety in social conduct
were ineffective in ensuring proper behavior. 9 The tendency
for any legal regime in China, therefore, has been to downplay
codified law.20 The fear, embodied in Confucian philosophy,
is that a society whose orderly functioning is "propped up" by
written law is a society vulnerable to crumble, should that
written law ever become inoperative.2
Against this backdrop, it is all the more dramatic that
China, since 1979, engaged in a frenzy of codification of a new
legal regime designed to attract the foreign investor to its soil.
Swallowing hard, China has placed a new emphasis on
restructuring its legal system, passing new economic laws and
regulations, and amending both.22 The crux of these new
laws was to create a secure investment environment, complete
with legal protections for the foreign investor." This flurry
of legislative activity was all in the hopes of signalling to the
international investment community that China is not only
amenable to the influx of capitalism inside its borders, but
that it also provides a stable investment environment. After
all, so the Chinese seem to think, more codification, and
amendments to what has been codified, translates into more
certainty built into the legal regime.
No bright line exists, however, between the pre-reform and
post-reform eras and, in fact, the traditional ideology and
attitude towards law has not truly changed in the post-reform
era. Indeed, it would be naive to believe that the traditional
"s Wil Armstrong, Comment, The Development of Commercial Law for
Foreign Investment in China, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 55, 55 (1989).13 Id.
, See Eileen Golden, Recent Development, People's Republic of China-
1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations-The Supplement of Detail,
In An Attempt to Attract Foreign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
389, 393 (1985).
21 Id
2 Zhang, supra note 14, at 291.
23 ICL at 295.
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emphasis on unwritten, accepted norms governing behavior in
society are now forgotten in this era of economic reform in
China. More realistically, these new paper laws are an
accommodation designed to attract the foreign investor.
It is questionable just to what extent these laws can be
integrated into a legal regime whose distinguishing feature is
marked by utter disdain for them. A healthy dose of caution
would be indicated for the Western investor, then, when
contemplating ajoint venture in China. In one sense, this new
economic scheme in China parallels the notion that "li" is
solely for those who occupy a higher plain in Chinese society,
for whom the fear of social sanction is enough. The concept of
"I" is not directed towards foreigners. "Fa," however, is
reserved for those not so socially enlightened, including the
foreign investor. Similarly, this mass codification seems to be
reserved for, and directed towards, the foreign investor and
not the Chinese national, for whom written law is less
necessary to govern conduct.
24
2.2. The Need for Foreign Investment as a Catalyst for
Economic Reform
Since the People's Republic of China was founded, it has
emphasized the goal of self-reliance as a society." The
Chinese soon realized, however, that to rely on their own
resources and remain at their then-technological stage of
development posed the surest formula for economic stagnation.
China, as a nation, began to realize that its quest for economic
development could be accelerated through a tolerance of, and
indeed, economic union with, foreign enterprises.2 6  The
decision had to be made to sacrifice the virtues of indepen-
dence so jealously guarded by the Chinese for the sake of
achieving economic prosperity.
In the late 1970's, China embarked on a new program of
economic reform designed to bolster the domestic economy, in
24 See Richard E. Pelosi, Jr., Note, A Comparison of Joint Ventures in the
People's Republic of China and Japan, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
95, 97 (1989) (citing RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 478-80 (2d ed. 1978)).
2r MATHUR & CHEN, supra note 8, at 134.26 Id.
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large part, by stimulating foreign investment and trade.2'
This program, the so-called "open door" policy,"8 was an
invitation for foreign investors to see China in a new light and
as the new international business venue. One aspect of this
open door policy is the program known as the Four
Modernizations, which focuses on the areas of agriculture,
industry, science and technology, and defense." The goal of
the Four Modernizations movement was to transform China
into an industrialized nation by the year 2000.0
In addition, this new era of reform was to be marked by
what is known as the principle of "equality and mutual
benefit."3" China's new open door policy would be one to
display remarkable tolerance for that which is in many ways
antithetical to its socialist system, but it would insist upon
being treated on an equal basis with that of its new economic
partners.
In light of China's new open door policy, a necessary evil
was tolerance by this socialist nation of capitalistic notions
formerly nothing short of repugnant to it. In the name of
economic progress, China repressed its xenophobia"2 and
extended a welcoming arm to the West. The compatibility of
capitalistic notions with this socialist regime is still an open
question. Thus, one cannot help but wonder how long that
welcoming arm will be extended if one regime cannot truly be
integrated into the other. At least for the time being, however,
ideology has given way to practicality and the traditional
dogma of socialism has softened somewhat to make room for
capitalistic vehicles that will put China on the proverbial
economic map. As the saying goes, "white cat, black cat,
whichever catches mice is a good cat."3"
27 Armstrong, supra note 18, at 56.
23 CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 1.
19 MATHUR & CHEN, supra note 8, at 9.
30 I
31 L& at 134.
31 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 513.
SId. at 515. The gist of this post-reform expression is that socialism
will yield to capitalism, or some combination of the two, to reach the
predominant goal of economic prosperity in China. Id. at n.11.
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2.3. The Legal Framework for Equity Joint Ventures in China
A cornerstone of the new open door policy in China and the
flrst significant piece of legislation promulgated pursuant to
this new program of economic reform is the JV Law. 4 The
promulgation of this law marked the beginning of a new legal
regime which allowed foreigners to conduct business on
Chinese soil for the first time.35
Equally dramatically, China promulgated in 1982 the
fourth constitution of the PRC (the "1982 Constitution") which
promises constitutional protection for direct foreign investment
in China.36 Article 18 of the 1982 Constitution was fashioned
to alleviate the fear and uncertainty of foreign investors that
their business endeavors would go unprotected.37 It states:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign
enterprises, other foreign economic organizations, and
individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter
into various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese
enterprises and other economic organizations in accor-
dance with the law of the People's Republic of China.
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic
organizations in China, as well as joint ventures with
Chinese and foreign investment located in China, shall
abide by the law of the People's Republic of China.
Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the
law of the People's Republic of China. 8
"' A.J. Easson, Contractual, Co-operative and Equity Joint Ventures in
the People's Republic of China, 3 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 145, 146-47 (1989). JV
Law, supra note 5.
" This Article will discuss this legal regime in greater detail. See infra
notes 73-133 and accompanying text.
" James V. Feinerman, Chinese Law Relating to Foreign Investment and
Trade: The Decade of Reform in Retrospect, in 2 CHINA'S ECONOMIC
DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s: THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMS, MODERNIZATION, AND
INTERDEPENDENCE 828, 829-30 (Study Papers Submitted to the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.)
(John P. Hardt & Richard F Kaufman eds., Apr. 1991). See also The
Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted by The Fifth Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1982 [hereinafter 1982
Constitution].
3 Feinerman, supra note 36, at 829-30.
38 1982 Constitution, supra note 36, art. 18.
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The plain language of this provision indicates that the rights
and interests of foreign investors will be protected in China.
As revealed below, this plain language may be at odds with the
real protections afforded foreign investors in China.
However, the 1982 Constitution is the PRC's fourth
constitution, and the Chinese do not downplay the importance
of its extension to foreign investors of various protections. Of
course, Article 18 makes explicit that the protection it extends
to foreigners investing in China depends ultimately on the
laws of the PRC.s'
In addition to the 1979 Law and the 1982 Constitution,
China has enacted a series of other laws supporting its new
program aimed at attracting foreign investment. First, in
1985, the Foreign Economic Contract Law (the "Contract Law")
became effective, superseding a 1982 statute.40 The Contract
Law governs the legal relationship between Chinese organiza-
tions and foreign organizations and individuals. It does not
govern contractual relations of Chinese individuals.4a In
addition, this law provides that "equity joint venture contracts
... may continue to be valid when new laws are enacted."42
This aspect of the Contract Law seeks to ensure that existing
joint venture contracts will not suffer automatic invalidation
with the subsequent promulgation of new laws. Further, while
the Contract Law requires that the contract conform to
Chinese law, if the contract omits a governing law clause
" Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 56.
4 Rongjie Ma, China Opens for Business, CORP. COUNSEL'S INT'L
ADVISER, Nov. 1985, at 6-08, 6-11. See also Foreign Economic Contract Law
of the People's Republic of China, adopted by The Tenth Session of the
Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, Mar. 21, 1985
(effective July 1, 1985) [hereinafter Foreign Economic Contract Law].
41 Ma, supra note 40, at 6-11. Nevertheless, where the Foreign Economic
Contract Law does not apply, or is silent, other international norms and
treaties, such as the United NAtions Convention on Contracts for Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 19 I.L.M. 671 (May 1980), govern the contractual
relations between both Chinese organizations and individuals and their
foreign counterparts. Armstrong, supra note 18, at 63 (citing Yan Zhao, A
Comparative Study of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Foreign
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TAX &
BUS. LAW. 26, 28 & n.13 (1988)),
41 Michael J. Moser, "Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Frame-
work," in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 90, 103 (2d ed. 1987). See also Foreign Economic
Contract Law, supra note 40, art. 40.
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dictating the applicability of Chinese law, international custom
and practice govern the contract.4
Secondly, China passed the General Principles of Civil Law
(the "Civil Code") in 1986. Article 41 of the Civil Code
formally conferred the status of "legal persons" on foreign
enterprises in China." The status of "legal person" affords
an enterprise civil capacity, competency to perform legal acts
and the right to independently enjoy civil rights and assume
civil duties. 5 The Civil Code also awarded equity joint
ventures and other foreign enterprises the status of limited
liability companies."'
Thirdly, in 1986, the State Council of the PRC promulgated
the Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment
4 Ma, supra note 40, at 6-11.
4' General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China,
passed by The Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr.
12, 1986, 1986 State Council Gazette 371, translated in English in Whitmore
Gray & Henry Ruiheng Zheng, General Principles of Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 715 (1986) [hereinafter Civil
Code]. Article 41 states:
State-owned and collective enterprises that meet the capital
requirements provided by the State, possess a charter, an organiza-
tional structure, and premises, and are able to assume civil
obligations independently, acquire the status of legal person upon
approval and registration by the responsible agency.
Sino-foreign equity joint venture enterprises, Sino-foreign
contractual joint venture enterprises and wholly foreign owned
enterprises established in the territory of the People's Republic of
China that meet the requirements for legal persons acquire the
status of Chinese legal persons upon approval and registration in
accordance with law by the administrative agencies for industry
and commerce.
Civil Code, art. 41.
'5 Civil Code, supra note 44, art. 36.
46 Article 48 states:
A State-owned enterprise legal person bears civil liability to the
extent of the property the State has given it to operate and manage.
A collective enterprise bears civil liability to the extent of the
property the enterprise owns.
Civil liabilities of a collective enterprise shall be satisfied from
the assets the enterprise owns. Sino-foreign joint venture enter-
prise legal persons, Sino-foreign contractual joint venture enter-
prise legal persons and wholly-foreign-owned enterprise legal
persons bear civil liability to the extent of the property the
enterprise owns, unless the law provides otherwise.
Civil Code, supra note 44, art. 48.
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(the "Encouragement Provisions").47 This set of provisions,
as its name suggests, was designed to stimulate foreign invest-
ment that declined after the initial interest in investment in
China after the promulgation of the 1979 Law. In addition,
the Encouragement Provisions were also fashioned to steer
foreign investment into high-tech and export industries in
China. 8 They target some of the perennial problems that
have plagued foreign investors, such as foreign exchange
shortages, high start-up costs and bureaucratic delays."9
Simplified, the Encouragement Provisions embody an incentive
package which distinguishes between "export enterprises" and
"technologically advanced enterprises" and all other forms of
foreign investment. 0 The last category of enterprises does
not enjoy the special myriad of benefits enjoyed by the former
two types of enterprises.51
In sum, China, since 1979, has attempted to promulgate a
variety of laws directed at supporting and encouraging foreign
investment in China. China has met with limited success,
however, in reviving the original enthusiasm of foreign
investment in that country. To many foreign investors, this
smattering of new laws represents little more than a promis-
ing, colorful exterior of an edifice of a legal framework that
lacks a solid foundation to support such a structure.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S EQUITY JOINT
VENTURE LAW IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE
THE WESTERN INVESTOR
There are three principal methods of direct foreign
investment in China.52 These include the equity joint yen-
7 The Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by the State
Council and effective October 11, 1986 [hereinafter Encouragement
Provisions].
"Armstrong, supra note 18, at 72.
49 Id.
5 Moser, supra note 42, at 130.
5 For a list of the benefits granted to export enterprises and technologi-
cally advanced enterprises, see id. at 130-32.
62 Zhang, supra note 14, at 292-94. Other forms of direct foreign
investment include compensation trade, processing and assembly, and lease
financing. For a more in-depth discussion of these, see id. at 294.
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ture ("EJV"), the contractual or cooperative joint venture
("CJV") and the wholly foreign-owned enterprise ("WFOE").
The focus herein is the EJV and its evolution; a detailed
discussion of the CJV and the WFOE is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, a better understanding of the EJV can
be obtained by contrasting it to the CJV and the WFOE.
Briefly, the EJV is a limited liability company: the parties
make capital contributions, either in cash or in kind; they
share profits in proportion to those contributions; they
establish a board of directors; they file articles of incorpora-
tion; and they pay taxes.5" The EJV is considered one of the
linchpins"' of economic reform in China. A more complete
discussion of the equity joint venture and its evolution will be
presented below.
Unlike the EJV, the CJV existed in China as an approved
form of foreign investment long before it was formally sanc-
tioned under the 1988 Cooperative Joint Venture Law.55 For
several reasons, foreign investors generally regard this type of
joint venture as affording a greater flexibility to the joint
venture partners than does the EJV.56 First, unlike the EJV,
the CJV need not take on the identity of a separate legal
entity. This allows the joint venture partners to maintain
their respective identities as separate legal persons.5"
Secondly, CJVs are subject to fewer legal restrictions than the
EJVs. 8 Thirdly, in contrast to the EJV arrangement, CJV
partners share profits from the joint venture in accordance
with the terms of their contract, and not according to the
proportion of their respective capital contributions." A
similarity between the EJV and the CJV, however, is that the
CJV foreign partner will most likely contribute capital,
advanced technology or equipment and materials, while the
Chinese joint venture partner will likely be the contributor of
5 Easson, supra note 34, at 151.
"Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 511.
5 Easson, supra note 34, at 152. Law of the People's Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures, adopted by The First
Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, Apr. 13, 1988.
5 Feinerman, supra note 36, at 831.
7 Zhang, supra note 14, at 293.
"" Feinerman, supra note 36, at 831.
59 Id
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in-kind contributions, such as the use of land, natural resour-
ces and labor. °
The law recognizing the existence of WFOEs was promul-
gated in 1986.6' However, WFOEs, like the CJVs, were in
existence as an approved form of foreign investment in China
long before 1986. The WFOE began as an experiment of sorts
in the Special Economic Zones (the "SEZs") situated in the
southern part of China. 2 The WFOE perhaps represents
tolerance of capitalism in China in the extreme. It is an entity
organized solely by a foreign company that (i) contributes the
entire equity required for its operation, (ii) enjoys the entire
profit of the enterprise and (iii) manages the enterprise in a
manner unassisted by a local partner."" This form of foreign
investment in China is undoubtedly the least favored by the
Chinese, since there is no transfer of technology to a Chinese
enterprise and there is no training of management skills for a
Chinese enterprise or its workers.6 The WFOE, however, is
considered a Chinese legal- person and, therefore, subject to
Chinese law. 5
Due to the lack of Chinese involvement, creation of the
WFOE is restricted to those operations which the Chinese
government deems beneficial to the country's economy and
those that utilize advanced technology and equipment in their
operations.66 Further, most or all of the products which are
the fruits of the WFOE must be exported, and therefore
constitute a source of foreign exchange so badly needed in
China.6
The EJV, the CJV and the WFOE are the current mainstay
of direct foreign investment in China. In varying degrees,
each allows the foreign investor the opportunity to enjoy the
Zhang, supra note 14, at 293.
Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 61. Law of the People's Republic
of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, adopted by The Fourth
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986 [hereinafter
WFOE Law].
" Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 61. See also Feinerman, supra
note 36, at 831.
" Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 61.
,41d
as Zhang, supra note 14, at 293. WFOE Law, supra note 61, art. 4.
"Zhang, supra note 14, at 293. WFOE Law, supra note 61, art. 3.
'7 Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 61.
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benefits and burdens of operating an enterprise in China. The
discussion will now turn to that enterprise which is the focus
of this Article, the EJV.
3.1. The 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law and the 1983
Regulations
China's JV Law has evolved in a rather piecemeal fashion.
The JV Law was well-received in terms of the new liberalism
it expressed by China for foreign investment on that nation's
soil. The initial reaction was one of great enthusiasm for this
newfound access to China's resources. As laws go, however, it
was widely regarded as little more than enabling legisla-
tion. 8 Thus, the early sentiment soon gave way to the
reality that the 1979 Law suffered from being so skeletal and
vague" that it left the foreign investment community devoid
of any real certainty in its investment in China. China has
clarified and amended the JV Law in response to declining
foreign investment after the initial enthusiasm among the
foreign investment community upon its passage in 1979.
The 1979 Law itself comprised fifteen short articles, and
there was precious little elaboration of the respective subjects
discussed within each article. For example, the 1979 Law
employed the use of terms, such as "profits,7 which had no
meaning in the context of Chinese domestic law, which is
based on socialistic principles. Further, Chinas domestic law,
what little existed in written form, was not capable of supple-
menting the capitalistic notions in the 1979 Law. That is, the
domestic law of China did not provide a legal framework, upon
which a foreign investor could rely, that would govern the
68 Brickley, supra note 6, at 258 (citing Jerome Alan Cohen et al.,
China's New Joint Venture Law, in A NEW LOOK AT LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BusINEss WITH CHINA, 195, 197 (Howard M. Holtzmann & Walter
Sterling Surrey eds., 1979)); Brian G. Brunsvold & Betty D. Battle, The
Prospects of Joint Ventures in China, 79 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 3, 6
(1981); Tao Tai Hsia & Elizabeth Haun, China's Joint Venture Law: Part
1, 1 CHINA L. REP. 5, 10 (1980).
69 Brickley, supra note 6, at 259. Some would claim that this vagueness
is deliberate and an excuse for the Chinese government to retain a great
deal of control over the enterprise. See id at n.7 for a discussion of this and
some other possible reasons for this vagueness in the JV Law.
O See, e.g., JV Law, supra note 5, art. 4.
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investment and provide some business predictability.7 '
Consequently, until 1983, the foreign investor was left to
interpret and to rely solely upon the 1979 Law.
In 1983, China promulgated regulations to the JV Law (the
"1983 Regulations") 2 were designed to address the deficien-
cies in the 1979 Law. The 1983 Regulations comprised 118
articles, which are divided into sixteen chapters. In many
ways, the 1983 Regulations clarified some points of confusion
and uncertainty for foreign investors in China.
The dual purpose of the JV Law, according to Article 1, is
to expand international cooperation and technological ex-
change."3 The 1979 Law allows the creation of those joint
ventures that "promote the development of China's economy
and the raising of scientific and technical levels.'" Elaborat-
ing on this language, the 1983 Regulations state that such
joint ventures must fit within one or more of the following
categories of industry: (1) energy development, building
material, chemical, and metallurgical industries; (2) machine
manufacturing, instrument or meter manufacturing, and
offshore oil exploitation equipment manufacturing industries;
(3) electronics, computer, and communications equipment
manufacturing industries; (4) textile, foodstuffs, medicine,
medical apparatus, and packaging industries; (5) agriculture,
animal husbandry, and fish breeding industries; and (6)
tourism and service trades.75
In addition, the first article of the JV Law requires that all
joint ventures in China be based on the principle of equality
and mutual benefit." This is the overriding concept in this
law, a jus cogens of sorts, such that an equity joint venture
71 Brickley, supra note 6, at 259. Fundamental to certainty in conduct-
ing one's business in the Western world is resort to company or corporation
law of a country. To date, China has not adopted such a law. Feinerman,
supra note 36, at 831.
", Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted
Sept. 20, 1983, translated in 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983) [hereinafter 1983
Regulations].
, JV Law, supra note 5, art. 1.
' 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 3.
' Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 517. 1983 Regulations, supra note 72,
art. 3.
" JV Law, supra note 5, art. 1.
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that breaches this principle will be disallowed." China
maintains a particular sensitivity in this regard, since
historically it perceived its treatment by other nations as being
less than equal and as a country to be exploited.7 By its
terms, Article 1 of the JV Law also suggests that Chinese
individuals are not permitted to invest in an equity joint
venture. It states that only "Chinese companies, enterprises
or other economic entities" are permitted to engage in joint
venture activities.8 0
Consistent with the principle of equality and mutual
benefit, Article 4 of the 1983 Regulations indicates that a joint
venture will be permitted to exist only if it meets one of the
following requirements: (1) it must employ advanced technolo-
gy and adopt modern, scientific management methods that
increase the variety of products produced, raise quality and
quantity of the products produced, and conserve energy and
materials; (2) it must provide benefits of technical innovation
which result in increased profits for decreased investment; (3)
it must enable an expanded production of exportable products
and result in the generation of increased foreign exchange
income; or (4) it must provide for the training of technical and
management personnel.8 " Because the joint venture in China
is considered to be a Chinese legal person, 2 it is subject to
the jurisdiction, and enjoys the protections, of Chinese law."
One of those protections is contained in Article 2 of the 1979
Law, which embodies the promise by the Chinese government
to protect the investment and profits of the foreign joint
venture partner." This provision is regarded by the foreign
investment community as a tacit promise to the foreign
investor that its investment in China will not be expropriat-
" Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 518. See 1983 Regulations, supra note
72, art. 5.
78 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
7s JV Law, supra note 5, art. 1
s Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 519.
s, Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 517-18. 1983 Regulations, supra note
72, art. 4.
s2 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 2.
83 1
s4 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 2.
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ed. 5 However, any discussion of notice by the government
and adequate protection in the event of an expropriation, in
the Western sense, is carefully dodged by the language of this
article.8 6 Even in light of the 1990 amendments to the 1979
JV Law, as discussed below,"' the possibility of and attendant
problems resulting from nationalization of the joint venture's
assets are still chilling for the foreign investor in China. An
amendment to the JV Law that codifies the Western concept
of adequate protection may provide some assurance to the
foreign investor. True comfort with the expropriation issue,
however, will likely follow only after China demonstrates a
track record of adherence to such an amendment.
Article 3 of the JV Law addresses the procedures for the
establishment of the equity joint venture. At the very least,
the process is cumbersome and time-consuming. In order to
obtain initial government approval, the Chinese joint venture
partner submits a project proposal and a feasibility study of
the proposed joint venture.8 8 A good deal of attention must
be given to these documents, as they form the basis for the
parties to "sell" the proposed joint venture"9 as beneficial to
China's economy and as satisfying one of the above-mentioned
justifications for the joint venture.9" Upon receiving govern-
ment approval, not itself a study in expediency,91 the parties
must prepare the requisite documents, which include a joint
venture agreement, a joint venture contract and articles of
association. 2
Pursuant to Article 4 of the JV Law, once created, the joint
86 Walter Surrey et al., Joint Ventures in China: The First Water Stop,
21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 221, 225 (1986).
"8 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 521. The Western, industrialized
countries part ways with the developing countries of the world on this topic.
In particular, with regard to what compensation should be paid in the event
of nationalization of the enterprise, industrialized nations maintain that
compensation must be prompt, adequate, and effective. Developing nations,
on the other hand, insist that compensation should be "appropriate" for the
situation, without regard to fair market value or the Western standard of
compensation. Id
87 See infra notes 134-60 and accompanying text.
8 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 9.
83 Easson, supra note 34, at n.37.
"See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
S, See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
H See JV Law, supra note 5, art. 3.
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venture takes the form of a limited liability company." This
same article requires the foreign joint venture partner to
contribute at least 25% of the capital required for the opera-
tion of the proposed joint venture." There is no ceiling set
for the percentage of ownership enjoyed by the foreign partner
thus, presumably, it could own up to 99% of the joint ven-
ture.95 Further, the joint venture parties share profits, losses
and risks in proportion to their respective contributions to the
joint venture. 6
Pursuant to Article 5 of the JV Law, the type of investment
into the EJV can take a variety of forms; it can be in cash, in
kind, or in intangible assets.9 Such intangible assets include
technology or management skills. Presumably, the Chinese
joint venture partner would prefer some mix of foreign
contribution that would include intangible assets, such that
the foreign partner's expertise is shared with its Chinese
counterpart. Furthermore, the JV Law explicitly mandates
that. any technology or equipment that the foreign party
contributes be "truly advanced and appropriate to China's
needs.""8 This twin requirement may be a tall order, because
in many industries advanced technology is not appropriate for
China's needs. China is reluctant to admit that oftentimes
appropriate, and not advanced, technology is the only technolo-
gy conducive to suiting its needs. It seems that China would
sooner send the message that it need not crawl before it walks
as a developing nation than acknowledge that very status it
now holds.
Among the approved forms of contribution, the Chinese
joint venture partner may contribute the use of the land
contemplated in the joint venture.9" This contribution is for
93 1& art. 4. See supra note 46 for China's statement of the attributes
and responsibilities of a limited liability company.
14 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 4.
"" Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 528.
96 JV Law, supra note 5, arts. 4, 7; 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, arts.
87, 88. However, the proportion of funds allocated for reserve, expansion,
and employee bonuses and welfare is decided by the board of directors. 1983
Regulations, supra note 72, art. 87.
97 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 5.
98 Id
99 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 5; 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, arts. 25-
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use of the land only, since land in China is either state- or
collectively-owned, and is not subject to individual owner-
ship.
100
Article 6 of the JV Law addresses the organizational
structure of the joint venture and its management. The joint
venture is required to have a board of directors.1"' The
board is the highest authority of the entity, and is vested with
decision-making power over all major questions.0 2 The
board of directors must comprise one chairperson, one or two
vice chairpersons, and at least three directors.' 0 Under the
JV Law and the 1983 Regulations, the chairperson was
appointed by the Chinese joint venture partner and thus was
usually a Chinese national, and the vice chairperson was
appointed by the foreign joint venture partner.1°4  This
mandate often translated into the unappealing situation in
which the foreign joint venture partner would own majority
control in the joint venture, without the ability to have its
representative be chairperson of the board. This was widely
regarded as a glaring contradiction to accepted international
practice, which holds that the largest investor is entitled to
selection or appointment of the chairperson of the board.10 5
Next, the joint venture in China must also have a manage-
ment office responsible for the daily operations of the enti-
ty.'0° These management positions may be held by either
Chinese or foreign nationals."°
Article 7 of the JV Law addresses taxes and the distribu-
tion of profits of the joint venture. The net profits of the joint
venture are distributed to the joint venture parties in accor-
dance with their respective contributions to the entity, after
the payment of income taxes and after any board-authorized
100 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 530.
101 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 6.
102 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 33.
M1d. art. 34.
104 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 6; 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 34.
This rule was liberalized by the 1990 amendments to the JV Law. See infra
notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
105 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 532.
'"1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 38.
' 7 d art. 40.
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reinvestment into the joint venture.' Joint ventures in
China are taxed in accordance with the Joint Venture Income
Tax Law.' This tax law provides for a basic thirty percent
joint venture income tax, to which there is added a local
surtax."n  However, additional tax incentives exist for
locating the joint venture in one of the Special Economic
Zones, where taxes on the joint venture will be reduced to
fifteen percent."' Other tax incentives also exist under the
Encouragement Provisions, and eligibility depends upon
whether the joint venture is considered export-oriented or
technologically advanced."'
Importantly, under the pre-amended JV Law, Article 8
required the joint venture to maintain an account with the
Bank of China or at a bank approved by the Bank of Chi-
na."' Under this same article, the joint venture is required
to be insured by Chinese insurance companies." 4
Article 9 of the JV Law concerns the operations of the joint
venture. A key part of this article is the strong suggestion
that the joint venture "should give first priority" to sourcing
the entity's operations with Chinese materials."' The joint
venture may obtain materials from outside the PRC, but
should only do this when the needed materials are of better
quality than those available in China or are manufactured
with advanced technology unavailable in China." 6 Further,
the 1983 Regulations strongly encourage the joint venture to
export its products for sale on the international market, thus
generating foreign exchange." 7
108 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 534. JV Law, supra note 5, art. 7.
108 Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China concerning Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted by The Third
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Sept. 10, 1980.
11 Id. art. 3. Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 536.
.. Easson, supra note 34, at 159.
112 Id Encouragement Provisions, supra note 47.
11 Surrey et al., supra note 85, at 225. This provision has been changed,
pursuant to the 1990 Amendments to the JV Law. See infra notes 152-54
and accompanying text.
114 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 8.
11r Id. art. 9.
11 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 539.
117 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 60. A distinct tension exists
here given the sometimes divergent goals of the Chinese and foreign joint
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Articles 10 and 11 of the JV Law address the problem of
remittance of capital earned by the joint venture. Both the
foreign joint venture partner and the individual foreign
employees of the joint venture may remit their earned foreign
exchange outside of the PRC." 8 As discussed below, howev-
er,1 9 under the current regime of foreign currency control in
China, foreign currency is freely convertible into the Chinese
renminbi, but renminbi is not itself a freely convertible
currency. 2 ' This situation has lead to creative structuring
of transactions, such as a barter or counter-trade arrangement,
which allows the foreign parties to realize the benefits of their
investments.' 2'
The term of the joint venture in China has been another
point of contention for foreign investors, and is addressed in
Article 12 of the JV Law. This article did not specify a specific
term for the joint venture, but did require a finite term."
The standard term for a joint venture in China was ten to
fifteen years, although a term of thirty years or greater was
possible under the 1983 Regulations if the joint venture
involved a large investment, a long period of construction and
low interest rates on funds. 23 The potential term of a joint
venture in China was extended by a 1986 amendment to the
1983 Regulations, allowing such joint ventures to continue for
a term of fifty years, and possibly longer, with the approval of
the State Council.' The term of the joint venture must be
stipulated in the joint venture contract and articles of associa-
tion, and any extension of the term is subject to approval by
the appropriate Chinese authority. 25 Not surprisingly, this
arrangement has had a chilling effect on foreign investors, who
may understandably regard the invitation to invest in China
venture partners. See, e.g., infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
1 JV Law, supra note 5, arts. 10, 11.
119 See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
.. Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 540.
± See, e.g., infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
, JV Law, supra note 5, art. 12. See also Sang & Wilson, supra note 2,
at 541.
1. 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 100.
124 Id as amended in 1986. See also Matthew D. Bersani, Some PR.C.
Joint Ventures Granted Unlimited Terms, 12 EAST ASIAN ExEc. REP. 9, 9
(1990).
... 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 101.
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as a tentative one. This issue was specifically addressed in the
later amendments to the 1979 Law, as discussed below."2 6
Article 13 of the JV Law governs the termination of the
joint venture. When the joint venture is terminated, the board
of directors is typically required to apply to the appropriate
Chinese authority for dissolution of the joint venture.' If
termination is approved, a liquidation committee is established
to oversee the distribution of surplus earnings, after the
extinguishment of all debts and obligations, in a manner
proportionate to the parties' respective contributions to the
entity.
28
The avenues for dispute resolution set forth in Article 14
of the 1979 Law have been expanded by the 1983 Regulations.
In the well-known Chinese tradition, the 1979 Law emphasizes
the informal, face-saving methods of dispute resolution:
consultation, conciliation and arbitration.' Resort to these
methods over litigation had the advantage, from the Chinese
perspective, of allowing for a resolution of the dispute without
labelling one party the winner, and the other, a loser.
The 1983 Regulations, however, adopt somewhat of a more
Western practice of dispute resolution. The 1983 Regulations
provide that disputes should be resolved "through friendly
consultation or mediation" as a first resort.3 0 Only if these
attempts fail should the parties resort to arbitration or
litigation to settle the matter.'3' The hierarchical nature of
these options suggests strong adherence by the Chinese to
their preference for non-confrontational dispute resolution
techniques. Not surprisingly, however, while accommodating
the Western investor by finally allowing the possibility of
litigation, the Chinese did not go so far as to allow that
litigation to take place in foreign courts. Instead, the 1983
Regulations specifically provide for resort to the courts of
China.' Article 15 of the JV Law gives as its effective date
126 See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
127 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 102.
12 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, arts. 103-106. Easson, supra note
34, at 160.
129 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 14.
13 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 109.
131 Id
13 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 111.
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July 8, 1979, the date of its promulgation."'
The purpose of the 1983 Regulations was to amplify the
rather skeletal introduction of international joint ventures in
China that the JV Law of 1979 announced. However, for the
reasons explained above, even these implementing regulations
to the JV Law left the foreign investment community less than
satisfied that China had made a heartfelt commitment to its
presence on Chinese soil. In response to this sentiment, China
amended the JV Law in 1990.
3.2. The 1990 Amendments
As discussed above, while the 1983 Regulations to the 1979
Law provided some guidance with regard to the original 15
articles, foreign investment in China still failed to increase
dramatically. China realized it needed to improve its joint
venture law further to make joint ventures in China more
attractive to foreign investors, and did this by amending the
law in April 1 9 9 0 .1' Specifically, with these amendments
(the "1990 Amendments") came substantive change in nine
articles of the JV Law.3 '
The first amendment to the 1979 Law adds a new para-
graph to Article 2 that embodies a promise by the PRC "not to
nationalize or requisition any equity joint venture," while at
the same time, it reserves the right to do so for a "public
purpose" in accordance with established "legal procedures" and
the payment of "appropriate compensation."'36 The Chinese
probably believe these provisions put teeth into the former
version of the law. However, from the perspective of the
foreign joint venturer, the amendment simply gives lip service
to Western notions of expropriation, which would require the
demonstration of a public purpose, and only then with
133 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 15.
* Amendments to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, adopted by the Third Session of the Seventh
National People's Congress, Apr. 4, 1990 (effective Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinafter
1990 Amendments].
"3 The amendments were to articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the
1979 JV Law, supra note 5. See also Dario F. Robertson & Xiaokang Chen,
New Amendments to the Chinese Equity Joint Venture Law: Will They
Stimulate Foreign Investment?, 18 IN'L Bus. LAW. 372, 372 n.1 (1990).
1" 1990 Amendments, supra note 134, art. 2. See also Robertson and
Chen, supra note 135, at 373.
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adequate compensation. The use of the term "appropriate
compensation," as opposed to "adequate compensation," is an
important distinction about which the Chinese undoubtedly
thought carefully.""7  In lesser developed countries, the
requirement of "appropriate compensation" essentially gives
the government a license to employ any measure it finds
suitable for the valuation of an enterprise."8 "Adequate
compensation," on the other hand, denotes the award of fair
market value for the enterprise under the circumstances.'
In short, there is no known standard under Chinese law"4
that lends predictability by which the foreign investor can
judge just how the Chinese will effectuate this amendment in
practice.
At best this amendment to Article 2 of the 1979 Law
represents a show of good faith, 4 ' and does little to alleviate
the fears of foreigners who are well aware that China can
reverse this policy or simply pass superseding legislation."
The fact that a public purpose must be found provides little
safeguard against such action by the PRC, since this require-
ment is not a difficult one for any government to fulfill.
Perhaps the only real safeguard to the nationalization of
foreign enterprises in China is the harsh response that would
follow any such action. In short, a nationalization of the joint
venture would result in the immediate cessation of operations
of the enterprise, thereby impeding the flow of foreign
exchange so coveted by China." Moreover, such action
would quickly send a very negative message to the investment
world, thereby further impeding the realization of Chinas
goals of economic reform.
A second amendment to the JV Law formally recognizes a
change in the contract approval process. This change had
already taken place in practice as a corollary to the decentral-
ization of government functions since the promulgation of the
' See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
* Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 750.13 Id.
14 Ning Zhu, The New Amendments to the Equity Joint Venture Law Are
Not a Cure-All, CORP. COUNsEL's INT'L ADVISER, Aug. 1990, at 63-06, 63-09.
141 See, e.g., Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 373.
14
2Id
" See, e.g., id.
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JV Law in 1979.4 Unamended Article 3 had previously
identified the Foreign Investment Commission as the arm of
the government with authority to approve joint venture
contracts." Amended Article 3 requires that such contracts
be submitted to the "State department concerned with foreign
economic relations and trade."4" By transferring the ap-
proval authority, the PRC recognizes that the economic reform
in China is one that is somewhat decentralized, with such
decentralization resulting in a multi-layered approval pro-
cess.
147
Next, Article 6 of the JV Law has been amended in an
attempt to maintain pace with Western practices concerning
the board of directors of an enterprise. Specifically, amended
Article 6 now permits the foreign investor to appoint a
foreigner as chairperson of the board of directors. 43 The
amendment to Article 6 further provides that the vice chair-
person of the board be selected by the joint venture partner
that did not appoint the chairperson.14  This change does
bring the joint venture in China more in step with Western
business practices. Its practical impact, however, may be
rather limited in the sense that the chairperson of the board
can be relegated to a figurehead who cannot act unless
specifically authorized by the board of directors in full.150 In
some instances, however, this amendment could have a real
impact in that the joint venture agreement often gives the
chairperson the power to cast the tie-breaking vote in instanc-
es of deadlock. 5' In any case, being able to appoint the
chairperson is important to some foreign joint venturers, and
this change will factor positively into their decision regarding
whether to locate in China.
An amendment to Article 8 eliminates the former require-
l'Id.
14 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 3. Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at
373.
14 1990 Amendments, supra note 134, art. 3. Robertson & Chen, supra
note 135, at 373.
147 Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 374.
'"1990 Amendments, supra note 134, art. 6.14 Id. Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 374.
'"Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 374.
'5' Zhu, supra note 140, at 63-08.
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ment that the EJV open a foreign exchange account with the
Bank of China or a bank approved by that bank.152 The
practical effect of this amendment remains in doubt, however,
because it does not grant real freedom to the joint venture
partners to select the bank of their choice at which to open a
foreign exchange account. 5 Under the amended Article 8,
the joint venture may open its foreign exchange account at "a
bank or any other financial institution which is authorized by
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control
. . . ."4 The same government interference with this selec-
tion exists since, pursuant to either the original 1979 Law or
the amended 1990 text, the Chinese government, and not the
joint venture parties, ultimately decides which banks are
eligible for such deposits.
The amendment to Article 12 addresses the problem of the
limited term allowed for the joint venture on Chinese soil.
Though Article 12 of the 1979 Law did not specifically limit
the term for joint ventures, the regulations implementing that
law did.'55 The wording of amended Article 12 does not
differ greatly from that of the old text; both essentially allow
the term of the joint venture to be determined by the part-
ners.' This amendment, however, is regarded as having
greater implications not for what it says, but for what it does
not say. By its silence as to term limitations, this amendment
appears to repeal the earlier regulations, which contained
maximum terms for the joint venture.' This, of all the
amendments, probably has the most significance because the
ability of the joint venture to operate indefinitely signals a
tremendous tolerance on the part of the Chinese for foreign
investment in their land.
One should not, however, be lulled into believing that every
joint venture will automatically be granted an existence in
China in perpetuity.5 ' Indeed, those foreign investors who
are allowed to stay indefinitely will be selected, and their
... 1990 Amendments, supra note 134, art. 8.
'm Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 374.
'5 1990 Amendments, supra note 134, art. 8.
15 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
156 Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 374.
167 Id-
15 Zhu, supra note 140, at 63-08.
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investment dollars will be the ones channeled towards the
industries that the Chinese covet most in their plan for
economic reform.
While these amendments . .. to China's joint venture law
are modest from the perspective of the foreign investor, at the
very least they demonstrate Chinas awareness that the initial
romance of investing in China had been replaced by grave
skepticism. This skepticism, coupled with the Tiananmen
Square incident that allowed the world to witness the violent
suppression of the democratic movement afoot in China,"e
nearly sounded the death knell for new foreign investment in
China. The 1990 Amendments are a step in the right direction
to resuscitate the thinking, outside of China, that foreign
investment in China has advantages that outweigh the
disadvantages. However, further change is still needed.
Specifically, change must come in the form of legislation that
addresses the real concerns of foreign investors: predictability
in the law and security of investment.
4. LINGERING PROBLEMS FOR WESTERN INVESTORS IN CHINA
Despite China's attempts, through the 1983 Regulations
and the 1990 Amendments, to satisfy the foreign investment
community that investment in China will be both beneficial
and secure, many problems still exist. Indeed, most of these
problems are a natural outgrowth of the fact that the Chinese
and the foreign joint venture partner often harbor quite
divergent goals and expectations for the joint venture. The
most prevalent of these problems will be discussed in this
section.
'" The 1990 Amendments also made a few "housekeeping" changes in the
equity joint venture law. These include (1) an amendment to Article 7
replacing a provision giving joint ventures employing "up-to-date technolo-
gy" certain tax benefits, with new language providing that an equity joint
venture may enjoy any tax benefits for which it qualifies under the tax laws;
and (2) an amendment to Article 13 that deletes the reference to the
"Foreign Investment Commission" as outdated. 1990 Amendments, supra
note 134, arts. 7, 13. Robertson & Chen, supra, note 135, at 374.
16" Lena H. Sun, Carter Presses China to Free '89 Prisoners; Blunt Speech
Delivered at Beijing Envoy School, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1991, at All.
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4.1. Foreign Exchange Restrictions
One of the most difficult hurdles for the foreign investor in
China to overcome is the very restrictive foreign exchange
policy. Because foreign exchange is scarce in China and
because Chinas program for economic reform depends on
foreign exchange, the Chinese employ two key principles with
respect to its foreign exchange reserves: centralized control
and "self-balance."' 1 The former principle speaks for itself.
Control over foreign exchange will not devolve to the provincial
and local levels, as may some controls in the era of economic
reform.
The "self-balance" principle involves the joint venture
achieving a balance between its foreign exchange receipts and
expenditures. 1" To do this, the joint venture must export
the better part of its entire production to generate the
requisite foreign exchange." This is desirable from the
perspective of the Chinese joint venture partner, assuming the
products are of a quality to compete in the world market.
However, one of the primary enticements to outsiders of
investing in China is to tap the tremendous number of
potential consumers in the Chinese market.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the joint
venture needs foreign exchange at each stage of the venture.
It requires foreign exchange at (i) the start up stage, to
purchase the necessary equipment and technology, (ii)
throughout the entire production stage, to purchase the
imported inputs it cannot source locally, and (iii) at the
interim final stages, when it must repatriate profits to the
161 Zhang, supra note 14, at 314. These two principles can be traced to
the Provisional Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's
Republic of China, arts. 3,5 (promulgated December 18, 1980 by the State
Council) and various economic laws pertaining to direct foreign investment
in China. See id. at n.56.• From 1986 forward, several regulations have been promulgated in the
PRC to alleviate some of the problems caused by the foreign exchange crisis
in China. These include the Regulations of the State Council on Joint
Venture's Balance of Foreign Exchange Revenue and Expenditure, the
Measures for Substitution of Importation with Products of Chinese-Foreign
Equity and Contractual Joint Ventures, and the Measures for Foreign
Investment Enterprises Purchasing Domestic Products for Export to Achieve
Balance of Foreign Exchange Receipts and Expenditures. Id. at 314.1 2 Id. at 314.
163 Id
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foreign investor.' Moreover, the promise by the Chinese
government in the 1983 Regulations that it would assist joint
ventures that produce for sale on the domestic market has
revealed itself as an empty one."
The problem is not an easy one to dodge, but various
mechanisms have been used to obtain some relief from China's
foreign exchange policy. Typical strategies employed to
combat this problem involve either planning to manufacture
products for export or attempting to target Chinas import
needs and manufacturing with an eye towards import substitu-
tion.'" Others make use of the profit swap centers, where
a joint venture may swap its profits, in renminbi, with those
in foreign currency earned by an enterprise which has enjoyed
a foreign currency surplus."e Another useful technique to
achieve a foreign exchange balance is the compensation trade
arrangement. With this strategy, there is an agreement
whereby an enterprise invests its foreign currency in a joint
venture in China in return for products which will be used by
that enterprise's operations in China or elsewhere. " ' Also,
a barter or counter-trade arrangement could be employed to
exchange goods for goods, services for services, or some
combination of the two. While these methods help alleviate
the sting of the foreign exchange shortage in China, they do
not eliminate it altogether. This is an area that China most
certainly should address if it wants to breathe new life into its
program of economic reform.
4.2. Market Access to the Chinese Consumer
One area where the incongruence of fundamental goals of
the Chinese and foreign joint venture partners is most
pronounced involves access to China's consumer market.
Article 60 of the 1983 Regulations encourages joint ventures
to sell their products on the international market."' 9 Indeed,
'"See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 7, at 116.
16 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 75. Feinerman, supra note 36,
at 833.
16 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 540.
167 Feinerman, supra note 36, at 833. See also Sang & Wilson, supra
note 2, at 541.
16 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 540.
"'1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 60.
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Article 61 of the 1983 Regulations permits joint ventures to
sell their products on the domestic market only if China
"urgently needs or imports" such goods.7 This sets the
stage for inherent tension between these two sets of invest-
ment partners.
What motivates foreigners to invest in China in the first
place is, in principal part, the ability to gain access to this
market of over one billion consumers."' The Chinese,
however, place very restrictive parameters on access to the
local consumer market, tolerating domestic sales only when
China has a demonstrated need for the product or it imports
the product. The heart of the problem here is that China's
policy to encourage sales on the international market is
inextricably bound with the problem of the foreign exchange
crisis, discussed above. 2 Further, government approval is
a prerequisite to selling in China's domestic market,"'
meaning the foreign joint venture partner will be subject to
many restrictions it may not have contemplated when deciding
whether to invest in China. A sure way to help revive interest
in foreign investment in China would be for the Chinese
government to relax the crippling restrictions on access to the
Chinese consumer that are now in place. If this goal of
reaching the domestic market continues to be frustrated,
foreign investors will simply look to other nations without such
restrictions to channel their investment dollars.
4.3. Unskilled Local Labor and Management
Again, the incongruity of the goals of the Chinese and the
foreignjoint venture partners presents a fundamental problem
in the area of developing labor and management skills. This
problem is multi-faceted. For reasons deeply rooted in culture
and economic philosophy, the Chinese labor force has tradi-
tionally not been very efficient or productive. In short, the
capitalistic notion of "more work, more pay"74 has never
played a role in the Chinese work force. Further, much of the
17 k& art. 61.
..1 Round-Table Report, supra note 1, at 6.
172 d. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
... Feinerman, supra note 36, at 833.
174 Golden, supra note 20, at 405.
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Chinese work force either lacks the necessary training, or has
been trained but lacks on-the-job experience.' 5 The 1979
Law remained silent on the topics of labor quality and wage
rates.176
The 1983 Regulations half-heartedly addressed some of the
problems in this area, but did not go far enough. Granted, the
1983 Regulations introduced the notions of labor-management
relations,' 7 the participation of trade unions in the opera-
tions of the joint venture,'" and the salary bonus
system.' These concepts, however, rooted in Western labor
law, are without foundation in Chinese business operations.
In this regard, the reality for foreign investors was not
changed very much by the 1983 Regulations. For example,
that reality included management's inability to discharge
employees who performed poorly, with the exception of labor
regulations in the SEZs, which allowed for the discharge of
employees in such instances."s
Where management is concerned, the warring goals of the
two joint venture partners plant a seed for ready conflict. The
foreign joint venture partner will want to staff the venture
with foreign management personnel in whom it has confidence.
This is juxtaposed with the fact that, not surprisingly, the
local joint venture partner, along with the local approval
authorities, will want Chinese nationals to staff the manage-
ment in the joint venture and thereby receive training in
management skills. This training, which will remain with the
individuals long after the joint venture is terminated, if that
is its fate, is one of the principal incentives for the Chinese
allowing foreign investment in China. Even when the foreign
joint venture partner agrees to have local management for the
enterprise, a common complaint of the foreign joint venture
partner is that the local candidates for management come from
a pool of rank and fie of the Communist Party, where title and
1 Cecilia Wagner, A Survey of Sino-American Joint Ventures: Problems
and Outlook for Solutions, EAST ASIAN ExEc. REP., Mar. 15, 1990, at 7, 9.
176 Golden, supra note 20, at 405.
177 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, arts. 91-94.
178 I& arts. 95-99.
17, Id. art. 93.
180 Feinerman, supra note 36, at 835. For a more in-depth discussion of
labor problems in China, see id. at 834-36.
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status are stressed over actual performance.' 8 '
This is certainly one area where some sacrifice is required,
most probably on the part of the foreign investor. It must
simply acknowledge that a key reason for China's openness to
foreign investment is the hope that some of its population will
become so trained. One way, albeit a slow one, to accommo-
date both sets of interests is to find local workers with
management potential and take the time to train them, either
on-site or at a United States facility."2 To obtain the bene-
fits of tapping China's resources and potential consumer
market, the foreign joint venturer may have to compromise the
efficiency to which it is so accustomed in a way that allows
local management to be trained in the daily operations and
responsibilities the joint venture requires. In this way, the
foreign joint venture partner must prove that it too can project
into the future for the long-term good of the enterprise, in the
same manner that it expects the Chinese government to so
project.
4.4. Sourcing and Quality of Materials and Lack of
Infrastructure
Pursuant to Article 9 of the JV Law" and Article 57 of
the 1983 Regulations,' a priority is to be given to Chinese
sources of supply for the joint venture, all conditions being
equal."s This presents several problems for the joint ven-
ture in that a "first priority""8 6 for sourcing from Chinese
materials exists, but all things are seldom equal. The fact is,
supplies may be unpredictable,8 7 prices may be unaccept-
able,' sourcing outside the locale of the joint venture
operation may be difficult,'89 and quality may be so poor that
even the Chinese joint venture partner may be resistant to
181 Wagner, supra note 175, at 8.
182 Id.
183 JV Law, supra note 5, art. 9.
18 1983 Regulations, supra note 72, art. 57.
1 ;d. Moser, supra note 42, at 115.
18 Zhang, supra note 14, at 302.
187 Id.
'" Wagner, supra note 175, at 9.
18 9 I&
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source locally.' 90
Many of the above-mentioned problems in sourcing arise
from the poor quality of the goods produced in China and the
poor infrastructure within which local facilities must operate.
Poor quality is attributable, in principal part, to the lack of
quality control standards or regular inspections. In addition,
there is generally a lack of incentive for doing good work.
19 '
The answer to this dilemma is to create incentives for good
work performance (e.g., merit bonus systems) and to imple-
ment quality control standards and a viable system for
monitoring compliance with those standards. One thing in
this regard is certain-if China does not address this problem,
its goods will remain unfit for the international market-
place. 9 2 This will surely frustrate the provisions governing
joint ventures in China which are tailored towards joint
venture production for export.
The quality-of-goods problem may be so intertwined with
that of another, namely poor infrastructure, that an attempt
at curing either problem can only go so far. The most aggra-
vated infrastructure problems are in the areas of transporta-
tion, energy and communications. China has no real system
for the efficient transportation of good and materials, leaving
many inland resources completely inaccessible.9 3 Many
roads that do exist are in poor condition or unpaved altogeth-
er.'" The railroad system in China is old and oversub-
scribed.'95 China's waterways tend to transport the vast
majority of goods, but they themselves are so congested that
ships can be at a standstill for weeks, if not months, before
cargo is unloaded.' Power shortages are also a constant
problem in China. 97 The problems in this area range from
periodic power outages to simply no electricity whatsoever. 9 '
Finally, China has a poor communications system. Telephones
IN Id.191 Id,
' Pelosi, supra note 24, at 107.
13 Patrucco, supra note 16, at 637.
134 Id.; see also Wagner, supra note 175, at 9.
155 Patrucco, supra note 16, at 637.
1 i M
97 Wagner, supra note 175, at 9.
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are a scarce commodity, and facsimile machines are practically
non-existent, especially in remote areas of the country.'
These problems are not easily rectified. China is a developing
nation in a "catch-22" situation: on the one hand, it requires
improvement in these areas to develop, while on the other
hand, it does not have a surplus of funds to allocate towards
improvements in these problem areas.
4.5. Government Approvals
The joint venture law in China seems to be evolving in the
direction of requiring more layers of government approvals,
rather than fewer. The result is a web of "bureaucratism"2 °
that is very unwelcoming for the foreign investor. The myriad
of layers of government approvals necessary for the joint
venture to even commence operations means that a ready
investment can often remain idle for an indefinite period of
time. Also, once operations finally begin, the Chinese govern-
ment is ever-present to oversee the enterprise at every turn.
At the very least, this situation creates a business-stiffinge °'
climate in which the foreign investor will find it difficult to
function.
No relief is in sight on this front. Foreign investors
wishing to take advantage of China's vast resources and
potential consumer market may have to adopt a newfound
tolerance for the pervasiveness of the government in its
business operations, and just hope for improvement. The
scenario of the Chinese government relaxing its grip on foreign
investment within its borders any time soon is not a likely one,
given China's deep-seated hesitancy to embrace the outside
world.
4.6. The Need For Further Legislation Integrating the Equity
Joint Venture into China's Legal Landscape
Enough time has passed since the introduction of the joint
venture law in China in 1979 to allow Chinese officials and
foreign investors both to reflect on most of the drawbacks of
19 ICL
200 Feinerman, supra note 36, at 834.
101 Sang & Wilson, supra note 2, at 546.
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investment in China from all perspectives. While China has
amplified and changed its JV Law over time, many of the
recurring problems have gone unaddressed altogether. There
are no quick solutions, but the time to begin rejuvenating the
former enthusiasm for foreign investment in China is now, if
China does not want to see those limited investment dollars
infiltrate, instead, the economies of its neighbors.
The answer lies beyond the continual and cosmetic shaping
of laws to make China a more attractive investment venue.
Future changes must be much more far-reaching than those of
the past.2 °= Since China has pronounced foreign investment
as critical to it program of economic reform, it must continue
to transform its foreign economic legislation in a direction that
makes the environment more and more fertile and secure for
such investment. Laws directed at foreign investment alone,
however, will just make their present isolationist existence all
the more pronounced.
In this vein, China must take concrete steps to integrate
more fully the existing foreign economic laws with those of its
domestic scheme. Unless this happens, foreign investment and
the law supporting it will continue to operate, as they have
thus far, in a vacuum. If China wants to recapture the foreign
investment market, it must do more than mimic something
resembling Western legal jargon in its foreign and domestic
laws. First, China must begin to build a bona fide domestic
legal regime that supports the foreign economic legal regime
that is currently in place. For example, China could begin to
address many of its domestic problems by creating laws and
regulations aimed at allowing currency conversion or increas-
ing productivity and the quality of goods. Then, China must
fully integrate its foreign economic laws into this domestic
legal regime. It must also provide real meaning for the
protections that it promises, and demonstrate to the interna-
tional investment community by way of action, and not just by
way of words, its dedication to providing these protections. In
short, it must provide an environment of predictability in the
law and security of investment.
2 Robertson & Chen, supra note 135, at 375.
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5. CONCLUSION
The commendable strides China has made to attract
foreign investors to its border must not cease with the recent
regulations and amendments to its joint venture law if China
is truly to realize its potential for holding a dominant place on
the international economic stage. While many problems still
await the foreign investor in China, the equity joint venture
remains a popular form of foreign investment. The structure
of the equity joint venture lends itself to an equitable sharing
of the profits, costs and risks of doing business in a foreign
land."' At a time when foreign investors in China cannot be
sure if the invitation of the last decade or so to invest in China
is a standing one, or one to be withdrawn when its immediate
purposes are served, the equity joint venture remains a good
vehicle for risk allocation in China.
If China is at all sensitive to the fact that foreign invest-
ment there has been diminishing in recent years, it should
concentrate on a next round of amendments or regulations to
the joint venture law that provide real protections and security
of investment in China. It should not stop at the four corners
of the foreign investment laws, however, to achieve this
security for foreign investors. Instead, China must integrate
those foreign investment laws into a revised domestic legisla-
tive regime that supports those laws and the goals they seek
to achieve.
203 Pelosi, supra note 24, at 95.
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